Abstract-The problem of strategically supported cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games is considered. It is assumed, that the cooperative agreement is reached and each player gets his payoff according to the payoff distribution procedure [5] . Following [3], to punish those who violate this agreement, the special game, which differs from initial only by payoffs of players on cooperative trajectory is constructed. It is shown that in the new game there exists an ε-equilibrium with payoffs of players equal to corresponding payoffs of players in cooperative solution of initial game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider n-person differential game Γ(t 0 , x 0 ) which is described by the state equatioṅ
where x is m-dimensional state of system, u i is a rdimensional control variable of player i, x(t 0 ) = x 0 is the arbitrarily chosen initial state of the system, A, B i are matrices of appropriate dimensions. The quadratic cost function of player i is
where
, P i -positive semidefinite, R ipositive definite matrices, i ∈ N. Payoffs are nontransferable.
We will assume that the players use admissible linear feedback strategies u i (t, x) = M i (t)x to minimize their costs.
Definition 1: A set of strategies
is called admissible if
are piecewise constant matrix functions with no more than one point of discontinuity t 1 and the resulting systems described by equationsẋ
andẋ
are stable.
Suppose that players agree to use a Pareto-optimal solution as optimality principle and use vector of weights
on their costs to obtain a Pareto-optimal outcome.
According to [2] find optimal cooperative strategies of players solving
Let
Finding of Pareto-optimal solution is reduced to linearquadratic optimal control problem (1)-(5) with one control variable u(t).
According to [1] we will find optimal control
and Θ α -a symmetric solution of matrix equations
requiring for individual rationality in the cooperative game are satisfied at initial time. Here V i (t 0 , x 0 ) -is Nash outcome of player i in the game Γ(t 0 , x 0 ). But if there exists such t > t 0 that for some i:
then time-inconsistency of the individual rationality condition is appear.
To overcome the time inconsistency problem in the game with nontransferable payoffs the notion of Payoff Distribution Procedure (PDP) was introduced by L.A. Petrosyan [5] .
Definition 2:
Definition 3: Pareto-optimal solution is called timeconsistent [5] , [4] if there exists a PDP such that the condition of individual rationality is satisfied
. Let for some Pareto-optimal solution the condition (10) is satisfied. Then there exist such functions η i (t) ≤ 0, that
In [5] the formula for PDP, which guarantees a timeconsistency in cooperative differential game with nontransferable payoffs, is considered. Theorem 1: (see [5] ) Let inequalities
are satisfied for some Pareto-optimal solution. Then PDP β(t) computed by formula
guarantees time-consistency of this Pareto-optimal solution along the cooperative trajectory x α (t). Here η i (t) ≤ 0 -are functions satisfying (13). According to (Başar and Olsder, 1999 ) Nash equilibrium in (1)- (2) is an admissible set of strategies {u
-symmetric solution of system matrix equations
III. STRATEGIC SUPPORT OF PARETO-OPTIMAL SOLUTION
We assume, that players agree to use such vector of weights (α 1 , · · · , α n ) that individual rationality of Pareto optimal solution is satisfied in the initial state of the system. And we use the time-consistent PDP:
In [3] , the problem of strategic support of cooperative agreement is investigated. It is proved, that for a special class of differential games time-consistent cooperative solution can be strategically supported by Nash equilibrium.
Following [3] to punish those, who violates cooperative agreement, the special game Γ α (t 0 , x 0 ), which differs from initial only by payoffs of players on cooperative trajectory is constructed.
Let J i (t 0 , x 0 , u) -payoff of player i in the game Γ α (t 0 , x 0 ). Then
where l is the last instant of time for which x(τ ) = x α (τ ), for all τ ∈ [t 0 ; t]. It means that in instant l occurs a deviation from optimal cooperative trajectory. And
Theorem 2: Let inequalities
are satisfied for some Pareto-optimal solution, then in the game Γ α (t 0 , x 0 ) for every ε > 0 there exists ε-equilibrium with players' payoffs (J
Proof: Consider the following strategy of player i in the game Γ α (t 0 , x 0 ): , x(l + δ) ), if at the instant l occurs a deviation from optimal trajectory and in the moment l + δ player i reacts on it.
(17) We can show, that for every ε > 0 there exists such δ(ε) that the constructed set of strategies is an ε-equilibrium in the game Γ α (t 0 , x 0 ).
If player i deviates from the optimal trajectory in the moment l, further in the game use strategiesũ i =M i x(t) and other players react in the moment l + δ, than player i will get not less than
Herex(t) is the decision oḟ
And
Since inequalities (10) are satisfied, we can choose such PDP β(t), that (16) holds. According to (16)
It means, that if player i deviates from optimal trajectory, then his payoff will not less than J α i (t 0 , x 0 , u α ) − ε, and constructed set of strategies is an ε-equilibrium with payoffs J α i (t 0 , x 0 , u α ).
IV. SCALAR CASE
Consider a scalar 2-player case of problem (1)- (2) x(t) = ax(t)
Suppose that players use vector of weights
on their costs to obtain a Pareto-optimal outcome. Then
We can see, that
If in the initial state of the system inequalities
are satisfied, then along all cooperative trajectory we will have
So to chose the parameter α we solve the system of inequalities
For example if a = b 1 = b 2 = p 1 = p 2 = r 1 = 1, r 2 = 2, then players can choose the value of parameter α from the interval (0.2261, 0.343).
In the scalar case we can chose β i (t) in the following way
And we can get the rule of choosing δ(ε):
V. CONCLUSION The problem of individual rationality and strategic support of Pareto-optimal solution in linear-quadratic differential games is considered. It is proved, that time-consistent Paretooptimal solution can be strategically supported by Nash equilibrium. Scalar case is investigated. It is shown that in the scalar case if the condition of individual rationality is satisfied in the begining of the game, then it will be satisfied during all period of the game.
